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INTRODUCTION 
Modern employment trends threaten to jeopardize what little 
privacy protections American workers have.
1
  Trends like private 
amenities on corporate campuses, using a single device for both work 
and personal purposes, social media usage, and the “24/7 workplace” 
provide more potential than ever before for privacy invasions while 
simultaneously denying employees the opportunity to obtain 
meaningful remedies for those invasions. 
The crux of the failure to adequately protect employee privacy lies 
in the structure of the legal standard itself.  Traditional privacy laws are 
deeply rooted in a flawed conceptual underpinning–the notion that 
legally protectable privacy in the employment relationship exists in a 
neatly discernable “private sphere.”2  This concept undermines the 
effectiveness of the legal tests
3
 to expand or even maintain privacy 
protections in employment.
4
 
First, this comment will identify the problem that modern 
employment trends collapse distinctions between private and work 
 
 1. See Ronald P. Angerer II, Moving Beyond A Brick and Mortar Understanding of 
State Action: The Case for A More Majestic State Action Doctrine to Protect Employee 
Privacy in the Workplace, 4 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 1, 4 (2013) (describing the current state of 
American employment law as “woefully inadequate in promoting and protecting employee 
privacy at the workplace.”).  
 2. See generally Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 
555 (2006).  
 3. A subjective-objective determination of the “reasonableness” of an employee’s 
privacy expectation operates as a threshold consideration to establishing privacy right in the 
employment relationship.  See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  
 4. Corey A. Ciocchetti, The Eavesdropping Employer: A Twenty-First Century 
Framework for Employee Monitoring, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 285, 291 (2011) (advocating for a 
recognition of actual employment monitoring policies because “[s]uch recognition must lead 
to a rebalancing of current legal provisions to reflect the realities of the twenty-first-century 
workplace.”). 
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spheres rendering the legal standards to determine privacy invasions at 
work futile.  Second, this comment will explore the modern 
technologies and work structures that complicate the effective 
application of traditional privacy tests.  Third, this comment will trace 
the historical development of privacy law and discuss the overarching 
concept of private spheres.  Finally, this comment proposes an interim 
solution borrowing well-established international privacy principles
5
 to 
promote transparency and choice in data use and collection.  The 
ultimate goal of the proposal is to empower workers as full participants 
in the economic, social and political processes necessary to overhaul 
the broken legal tools, which fail to protect employee privacy. 
I. THE LEGAL PROBLEM — COLLAPSED DISTINCTIONS 
BETWEEN PRIVATE AND WORK SPHERES RENDER LEGAL 
DOCTRINES OF PRIVACY LAW FUTILE IN THE EMPLOYMENT 
RELATIONSHIP 
The legal standard to determine an invasion of privacy is 
insufficient to fully capture the complexities of the modern 
employment relationship.
6
  The current standard exacerbates the 
existing power imbalance between employer and employee because “it 
gives the employer the power to determine its liability simply by 
modifying the work environment to decrease employee privacy 
expectations.”7  Nevertheless, it is not enough to redraft the current 
legal tests because the central concepts in privacy doctrine are rooted in 
a distorted legal fiction of a distinct “private sphere” that is unrealistic 
to provide protection in the modern workplace where clear distinctions 
between work and private lives have collapsed.
8
 
Under the existing regime, employee privacy rights have 
significantly diminished
9
 and current workplace organization trends are 
 
 5. OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal 
Data, THE ORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION & DEVELOPMENT, 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderfl
owsofpersonaldata.htm#guidelines. 
 6. Angerer, supra note 1, at 3-4 (advocating for increased state action to protect 
employee privacy “[m]oreover, employment law has, unfortunately, proven to be woefully 
inadequate in promoting and protecting employee privacy at the workplace.”). 
 7. Larry O. Natt Gantt II, An Affront to Human Dignity: Electronic Mail Monitoring 
in the Private Sector Workplace, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 345, 424 (1995). 
 8. Ken Strutin, Social Media and the Vanishing Points of Ethical and Constitutional 
Boundaries, 31 PACE L. REV. 228, 229 (2011) (advocating for a paradoxical shift in 
perceptions to meet the spatial complexities of the “virtual socialscape exists at right angles 
to the physical world, and so our perceptions must bend accordingly.”). 
 9. Angerer, supra note 1, at 5 (elaborating that “scholars have described current 
employee privacy under the law as: ‘near extinction,’ usually lacking a remedy for 
employees, and approaching the point where, ‘employers can become Big Brother’”). 
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likely to provide employees with a false sense of security about their 
privacy rights.
10
  The increased capabilities of new monitoring 
technologies, coupled with the risk of employee misconception of their 
legal rights, threaten to unnecessarily complicate workplace dynamics 
and undermine the limited privacy protections available to 
employees.
11
 
Two critical issues remain unsettled in employment privacy law 
and threaten to give rise to a wave of unnecessary litigation if 
technological trends and work structures continue current trajectories. 
First, modern technologies complicate the application of privacy law in 
the employment relationship because monitoring technologies can 
collect more data than ever before, thus unnecessarily increasing the 
risk of invading an employee’s “private sphere.”  Second, both 
employer and employee expectations of their working relationship are 
not in harmony with actual legal rights to privacy. 
II. ANALYSIS 
Meaningful privacy protections for workers are often thwarted by 
the very legal standards established to create privacy rights.
12
 
Employers effectively control the scope of an employee’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy by manipulating practices and procedures in the 
workplace. This uneven balance of power and information in favor of 
the employer, has potentially harmful repercussions such as “the 
impact of excessive and undisclosed monitoring in employee 
morale.”13 
Finally, the reasonable expectation of privacy standard as applied, 
does not mesh with actual practice and employee perceptions. 
Businesses are global and mobile, requiring a flexible workforce 
willing to give up ever-increasing amounts of their personal time to 
contribute their labor.
14
  Twenty-first century workers rarely enjoy the 
seclusion of a true private sphere and converge their work and private 
 
 10. Ciocchetti, supra note 4, at 290–91 (arguing that “it is important that the law 
recognize the power of contemporary monitoring technology, the ever-increasing number of 
hours contemporary Americans spend at work, and the impact of excessive and undisclosed 
monitoring on employee morale. Such recognition must lead to a rebalancing of current 
legal provisions to reflect the realities of the twenty-first-century workplace”). 
 11. Id. at 357-58 (explaining that “[i]t is an easy case to make that the current legal 
regime is inadequate to protect an employee’s every move from the scrutiny of today’s 
monitoring practices”). 
 12. Angerer, supra note 1, at 4 (reiterating that “[m]oreover, employment law has, 
unfortunately, proven to be woefully inadequate in promoting and protecting employee 
privacy at the workplace”). 
 13. Ciocchetti, supra note 4, at 290–91.  
 14. Gantt, supra note 7, at 424. 
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lives into their daily routines.  These trends towards comingled work 
structures and technological advancements in monitoring threaten to 
erode employee privacy rights because any employee’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy is subject to modification by the employer. 
A. Modern Technologies Complicate Effective Application of the 
Traditional Privacy Tests 
Modern monitoring technologies collect more data than ever 
before and present an unprecedented risk of invading employee 
privacy.  These advances in the capacity of monitoring technologies 
and their pervasive use to monitor employees present an unprecedented 
risk of invading employee privacy.
15
  These new and emerging 
technologies are problematic in the employment context because they 
facilitate privacy invasions into “the personal lives of employees with 
little or no chance of detection,” and “[allow]  employers to 
manipulate, access, and collect information about employees in greater 
amounts than previously possible.”16 
Many savvy employers leverage the work related technology they 
provide to their employees as a tool to closely monitor employees.
17
  
These electronic monitoring efforts may inspect employee 
communications and movements, including phone calls, e-mails, 
internet usage and Global Positioning System (GPS) enabled devices.  
Even when employers have legitimate business reasons to justify 
monitoring,
18
 the risk of collecting incredibly sensitive personal 
information of workers that are in turn subject to various overlapping 
privacy regimes and government agencies may curb the savvy 
employer’s appetite for widespread use of these disruptive 
technologies. 
Unfortunately these technological advancements “outpace existing 
 
 15. Ciocchetti, supra note 4, at 357–58(explaining that “[i]t is an easy case to make that 
the current legal regime is inadequate to protect an employee’s every move from the 
scrutiny of today’s monitoring practices”). 
 16. Gantt, supra note 7, at 346. 
 17. See Melinda L. McLellan et al., Wherever You Go, There You Are (with Your 
Mobile Device): Privacy Risks and Legal Complexities Associated with International “Bring 
Your Own Device” Programs, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 30 (2015).  Consistent with the 
fractured privacy regulatory regimes in the United States, new technologies and BYOD 
policies are subject to multiple potentially overlapping federal statutes including: Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act; the Stored Communications Act; and the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act. 
 18. Greg Mgrditchian, Employment & Social Media Privacy: Employer Justifications 
for Access to “Private” Material, 41 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 108, 133 (2015) 
(elaborating that legitimate business concerns may include: “concern[] with the public 
image of their business, the economic viability of the company, the protection and safety of 
other employees and customers, [and] avoiding lawsuits”). 
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legal sources of privacy protection, as courts seem unwilling or unable 
to protect employees from purely electronic invasions of privacy.”19 
1. BYOD/Single Device Issues 
The common practice of an employee using a single internet 
capable device to complete both personal and professional tasks
20
 
exemplifies the ways in which a delineable zone of work is inadequate 
to address the realities of modern employment trends. 
“Bring Your Own Device” (BYOD) policies have evolved as the 
“go-to standard in most workplaces.”21 Corporate BYOD policies 
encourage a work culture where employees are available to perform 
work related tasks at any hour.
22
 The practice of comingling personal 
and work related data on the same device may be mitigated somewhat 
through geofencing software,
23
 but ultimately BYOD highlights just 
how entangled the private and work realms have become.
24
 
BYOD policies demonstrate the interests at odds in employment 
privacy and technological advancements—the employee interest in 
personal data privacy is pitted directly against the employer cyber 
security and trade secret concerns.
25
  The technology also presents a 
complicated conceptual challenge to existing employment privacy laws 
and practical challenges with attempts to “disentangle the personal 
from the professional when it comes to protecting and monitoring data 
on their employees’ devices—and this premise assumes it is even 
possible to make a meaningful distinction between the two.”26 
2. GPS Technology 
Another technological advancement with serious employment 
 
 19. Gantt, supra note 7, at 346. 
 20. McLellan et al., supra note 17, at 1. 
 21. Freeland Cooper, Foreman LLP, BYOD? Avoiding the Pitfalls of Employee Use of 
Personal Devices, 22 No. 13 CAL. EMP. L. LETTER 10 (Oct. 8, 2012).  
 22. See McLellan et al., supra note 17, at 3 (explaining that “BYOD is touted as 
‘combining workforce mobility and ‘always reachable’ boosts in employee productivity 
with possible savings on corporate telecom services and device spending.’”). 
 23. Roman Foeckl, Why Geofencing Will Become the Next Endpoint Security 
Innovation, SC MAGAZINE UK (May 6, 2015), 
http://www.scmagazineuk.com/why-geofencing-will-become-the-next-endpoint-security-
innovation/article/413037/.  “Geofencing can restrict access to devices or 
applications while inside a company's perimeter, making it impossible for 
devices outside the perimeter to access the network.” 
 24. See McLellan et al., supra note 17, at 3–4 (reiterating the purported benefits of 
BYOD “as a boon to employees [who] want to use their own smartphones and tablets at 
work for convenience as the border between work and personal or recreational activities 
continues to blur”). 
 25. Id. at 4–6.  
 26. Id. at 4.  
2017] #PRIVATESPHERE 293 
privacy implications is the rise in devices that include Global 
Positioning System (GPS) technology.  GPS is a satellite-based 
navigation system in which a “receiver can accurately determine its 
position within a few meters.”27  GPS devices in company issued cell 
phones and vehicles “allow . . . employers to keep tabs on employee 
hours or vehicle travel.”28  The potential privacy invasions at risk with 
GPS technology are even more problematic than standard surveillance 
because of “the extraordinary capacity of a GPS device to permit 
‘[c]onstant, relentless tracking of anything.’”29 
Some state courts have begun to address the privacy implications 
of GPS tracking technology in the workplace.  For example, in 
Cunningham v. New York State Dep’t of Labor the court ordered 
suppression of GPS evidence because the public employer failed to 
“mak[e] a reasonable effort to avoid tracking an employee outside of 
business hours.”30  The court created a categorical GPS exception to a 
general rule that permits employers to use “permissible portion[s] of 
the search” even when the search as a whole exceeds its permissible 
scope.
31
  The court reasoned that the very nature of GPS technology to 
monitor intimate details makes the previous rule that favored 
employers simply “inapplicable to GPS searches.”32 
Additionally, in Haggins v. Verizon New England, Inc. union 
employees were allowed to challenge their employer’s use of GPS 
tracking software as both an unfair labor practice and an invasion of 
privacy.
33
  In Haggins, the court did not decide the privacy issue on its 
merits, but proceeded to outline the difficult test an employee seeking 
privacy protections must meet.
34
 The Massachusetts test required 
employees to show “not only that the [employer] unreasonably, 
substantially and seriously interfered with [their] privacy by disclosing 
facts of highly personal or intimate nature, but also that it had no 
 
 27. Adam Koppel, Warranting A Warrant: Fourth Amendment Concerns Raised by 
Law Enforcement’s Warrantless Use of GPS and Cellular Phone Tracking, 64 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 1061, 1063–64 (2010). 
 28. Id. at 1064. 
 29. Cunningham v. New York State Dep’t of Labor, 21 N.Y.3d 515, 523 (2013) 
(quoting People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 441 (2009)). 
 30. Id.  
 31. Id. (noting that the “extraordinary capacity” of the technology makes it 
categorically unfit for the general rule). 
 32. Id.  
 33. Haggins v. Verizon New England, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 2d 326, 328-30 (D. Mass. 
2010) aff’d, 648 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2011).  
 34. Haggins v. Verizon New England, Inc., 648 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding 
that the Labor Management Relations Act preempted the employee’s privacy claim and that 
resolution of their claim required interpretation of their collective bargaining agreement).  
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legitimate reason for doing so.”35  This reiteration of the reasonableness 
requirement is particularly challenging for non-union employees, 
because without independent contractual protections the default 
contours of reasonableness rely on merely on industry standards.
36
 
3. The Internet of Things 
The number of devices connected to the internet has increased 
exponentially,
37
 and the proliferation of these devices as tools to 
increase work productivity create heightened privacy risks in the 
modern employment relationship. 
The term Internet of Things (“IoT”) broadly encompasses the 
“network of physical objects embedded with electronics, software, 
sensors and connectivity” which in turn “enable [those objects] to 
achieve greater value and service by exchanging data with . . .  [an] 
operator.”38  For example, modern objects like fitness trackers, cell 
phones, refrigerators, thermostats, Amazon’s “dash button,”39 cars, and 
even children’s toys40 are part of the growing Internet of Things 
because they connect to the internet and exchange data to perform 
specific functions.
41
 
In 2015, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) estimated the 
 
 35. Id. (quoting Martinez v. New Eng. Med. Ctr. Hosps., Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 257, 267 
(D. Mass. 2004). 
 36. Id. at 55–56 (noting that a key factor “to determine the reasonableness of the 
interference likely will require resort to the custom and usage of the parties and their 
particular industry practices”). 
 37. See Federal Trade Commission Remarks, How to Regulate the Internet of Things 
Without Harming Its Future, 2015 WL 3541727, at 3 (May 21, 2015) (showing the trend 
that “[r]esearchers have estimated 900 million devices were connected to the Internet in 
2009, increasing to 8.7 billion devices in 2012, and now up to 14 billion devices today” and 
predicting the trend growing “that by 2020 there will be 25 to more than 30 billion devices 
connected to the Internet of Things”). 
 38. Id. at 1 (quoting Internet of Things, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_of_Things). 
 39. Amazon’s “Dash Button” is a plastic button that allows “shoppers to reorder 
frequently used domestic products like laundry detergent or paper towels with the click of a 
real-life button.” Ian Crouch, The Horror of Amazon’s New Dash Button, THE NEW 
YORKER (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/the-horror-of-
amazons-new-dash-button. 
 40. Mattel’s “Hello Barbie” is a doll connected to the internet featuring speech 
recognition and progressive learning features which allow a user to engage in “real-time 
artificially intelligent conversations” with a doll that is constantly transmitting the 
information it receives from the user to have more personalized “conversations.” Hello 
Barbie Frequently Asked Questions, http://hellobarbiefaq.mattel.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/hellobarbie-faq-v3.pdf. 
 41. See Andy Greenberg and Kim Zetter, How the Internet of Things Got Hacked, 
WIRED MAGAZINE (Dec. 28, 2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/12/2015-the-year-the-
internet-of-things-got-hacked/. 
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number of internet connected devices to be 14 billion,
42
 put another 
way “[t]here are currently more devices connected to the internet than 
people on the planet.”43  As these devices become more prolific 
throughout the global economy, they have also found their way into the 
employment relationship through telepresence and wearable 
technology.
44
  If market trends continue, some hypothesize 
fundamental “change[s] [in] the organization of work and our 
workspaces” where workers rely on “algorithms embodied as robots or 
avatars [to] provide solutions to problems [and] facilitate decision-
making.”45 
These devices have the ability to track incredibly intimate details 
about an employee
46
 and yet their development, use, and proliferation 
continue without regulatory protections. In January 2015, the FTC 
suggested that because the industry is still in its infancy, specific 
legislation targeting the industry would be unduly burdensome to 
developers and ineffective to protect consumers.
47
 
The unprecedented ability of devices in the Internet of Things to 
both monitor and interact with private details about employees 
combined with the lack of federal regulation in the area presents 
significant risk of invasion of employee privacy. 
4. Social Media Usage in Workplace 
Finally, the pervasiveness of social media presents additional 
technological complications to workplace privacy where the “legal 
implications of this movement are still evolving daily.”48 Social 
 
 42. Federal Trade Commission Remarks, How to Regulate the Internet of Things 
Without Harming Its Future, 2015 WL 3541727, at 3 (May 21, 2015). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Jason Corsello, What the Internet of Things Will Bring to the Workplace, WIRED 
MAGAZINE, http://www.wired.com/insights/2013/11/what-the-internet-of-things-will-bring-
to-the-workplace/. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Federal Trade Commission, Internet of Things: Privacy & Security In a 
Connected World (Jan. 2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-staff-report-
november-2013-workshop-entitled-internet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf  
(explaining that “one researcher has hypothesized that although a consumer may today use a 
fitness tracker solely for wellness-related purposes, the data gathered by the device could be 
used in the future to price health or life insurance or to infer the user’s suitability for credit 
or employment”).   
 47. See generally Federal Trade Commission, Internet of Things: Privacy & Security In 
a Connected World (Jan. 2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-staff-report-
november-2013-workshop-entitled-internet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf.  
 48. Mgrditchian, supra note 18, at 109.  
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media
49
 sites like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and LinkedIn “gained 
prominence rapidly” and have drastically changed the tone and impact 
of life in the Information Age.
50
  As of September 2016, Facebook had 
over 1.79 billion active users, and of those active users an average of 
1.09 billion people used a mobile device to access the site each day.
51
 
The massive popularity of online sharing combined with the 
estimate that “employees spend about [an average of] one to two hours 
a day using the Internet for personal use” exposes a potentially vast 
workplace privacy issue as “it is not hard to imagine that in today’s 
society, where technology and communication join at the proverbial 
hip, social media use during work hours is a widespread issue.”52 
Employer and young professional interests in social media could 
converge as the ability to use social media during work becomes an 
exchange for payment.
53
  Surprisingly, Millennial workers place such a 
high value on “social media flexibility” that one poll revealed that 45% 
of participants would accept a position with lower wages in exchange 
for a “more liberal policy toward personal tech devices and access to 
social media at work.”54 Social media has developed into a widespread 
form of instantaneous communication,
55
 and the complicated 
interwoven personal and professional functions they serve also 
undermine the legal myth of a purely private sphere. 
An employer may inadvertently capture social media data on its 
employees when an employee accesses the site on a company network, 
or an employer may intentionally capture this data as part of its routine 
employee monitoring policy.  Employers justify monitoring the social 
media activity of employees as necessary to address legitimate business 
 
 49. Cal. Lab. Code § 980 (defining social media as “an electronic service or account, or 
electronic content, including, but not limited to, videos, still photographs, blogs, video 
blogs, podcasts, instant and text messages, email, online services or accounts, or Internet 
Web site profiles or locations”). 
 50. Strutin, supra note 8. at 287–89 (concluding that the movement towards social 
media is a “new part of the Information Age, the Social Media Era.  It is the time of quantum 
computing and the specter of nearly a billion personal profiles online”). 
 51. Facebook Newsroom, Statistics (2016), http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/. 
 52. Mgrditchian, supra note 18, at 116 (describing the pervasiveness of internet use–
“[s]tudies show that, on average, employees spend about one to two hours a day using the 
internet for personal use”).   
 53. Strutin, supra note 8, at 288. 
 54. Mark I. Schickman, Dude How Fast Is Your Connection?, 21 NO. 20 CAL. EMP. L. 
LETTER 3 (Jan. 23, 2012). “CISCO [] polled 2,800 college students and young professionals, 
[and] it found that social media flexibility was a significant factor in job choice: 40 percent 
of the college students and 45 percent of the employed 20-somethings said they would take 
a lower-paying job with a more liberal policy toward personal tech devices and access to 
social media at work.”  
 55. Mgrditchian, supra note 18, at 116 (explaining that “[t]he world’s two most popular 
social media sites, Facebook and Twitter, have approximately 1.11 billion and 232 million 
active users, respectively.”).   
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concerns such as productivity, safety, and reputation.
56
  However, 
employers who engage in extensive social media monitoring should 
beware the risks of obtaining too much information. 
For example, in 2010 the National Labor Relations Board 
(“NLRB”) began policing employers who terminated employees 
because of their social media activity.
57
  The NLRB investigated and 
prosecuted employers with written social media policies that had the 
potential to violate the National Labor Relations Act, because the 
policies “interfered with the rights of employees . . . to discuss wages 
and working conditions with co-workers.”58  Due to the influx and 
uncertainty in the law,  employers may now refrain from establishing 
written social media policies to avoid potential liability from the 
NLRB.
59
 
B. Workers May Lack Understanding of the Implications of Privacy at 
Work 
The daily reality of employee interactions with their employer, 
coworkers, schedules and environment fosters misconceptions about 
the true privacy risks employees face during work and the effectiveness 
of any legal remedy.  The business trends to incorporate personal 
amenities into the workspace and encourage on-call but “flexible” 
work schedules may signal to employees that they have some 
autonomous control over their personal privacy while at work. 
1. Corporate Campus Operates as a Company Town 
First, the environment of a modern corporate campus intentionally 
bleeds the lines between traditional “private sphere” and “work” 
activities much like the Industrial Era company town.
60
  At first glance 
this blended work and private environment may appear altruistic, but 
 
 56. Id. at 133 (noting that an employer’s legitimate business concerns include: 
“concern with the public image of their business, the economic viability of the company, the 
protection and safety of other employees and customers, avoiding lawsuits, and many other 
things that can affect an endless amount of people”). 
 57. The NLRB and Social Media, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: NEWS & 
OUTREACH: FACT SHEETS, https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/fact-sheets/nlrb-and-social-
media (explaining that “[i]n four cases involving employees’ use of Facebook, the Office of 
General Counsel found that the employees were engaged in “protected concerted activity” 
because they were discussing terms and conditions of employment with fellow 
employees.”). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Scott A. Faust, Electronic Workplace Monitoring and Surveillance, Practical Law 
Practice Note, 1-506-8862 (advising employers to “use caution before taking any personnel 
or legal action against an employee for Facebook or other social media posts in light of 
recent decisions by the [National Labor Relations Board] NLRB.”). 
 60. See infra section IV A 2 ii  (discussing work organization of company towns). 
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its rise as the new social norm threatens to repeat history and block 
employees from any reasonable expectation of privacy. 
One-way employers entice modern workers to devote more time 
and energy to company productivity is through benefits and 
accommodations.  These benefits encourage employees to rely on their 
employer for tasks that were once reserved for private life after 
working hours. 
For example, some of the benefits Silicon Valley companies 
provide include on site gyms, free or subsidized meals, dry cleaning 
services, scheduling last minute babysitters for sick kids, or even house 
cleaning services.
61
 The inclusion of these traditionally private 
individual responsibilities into the fabric of work life has created a 
corporate campus that resembles a modern day company town.  
Because the corporate campus arguably serves as a blended space for 
individuals to contribute productive labor and fulfill personal needs, 
employees may unknowingly sacrifice their privacy protections 
because they lack reasonable privacy expectations while using 
employer services on employer property. 
2. Flexible Work Schedules May Warp Expectations 
Second, the flexible yet continuous schedules of modern work 
may give employees a false illusion that autonomy to control the hours 
in which they work also carries implicit rights to privacy.  Employees 
dedicate an ever-increasing number of hours to their work,
62
 and 
simultaneously manage their personal and business responsibilities 
from the same devices.  Because the “new world order is a 24/7 
workplace”63 where employees are expected to use the internet to work 
anywhere and anytime,
64
 some may believe that the brief moment spent 
answering a late night work email from home and then setting up a 
confidential doctor’s appointment the next minute means that the latter 
is protected from an employer’s prying eyes.  This trend to more 
flexible but overall longer workdays only “[intensifies the] need for 
 
 61. John C. Goodman, Silicon Valley Employers Go Wild With Lavish Employee 
Benefits, FORBES (Oct. 30, 2012),  
http://www.forbes.com/sites/johngoodman/2012/10/30/silicon-valley-employers-go-wild-
with-lavish-employee-benefits/. 
 62. Ciocchetti, supra note 4, at 290–91.  
 63. Michelle Lee Flores, Cozen O’Connor, 7 ‘Gotchas’ of the 24/7 Workplace, 25 No. 
10 CAL. EMP. L. LETTER 4 (Aug. 24, 2015).  
 64. Claire Cain Miller, Silicon Valley Is Growing Up, Giving Parents a Break, THE 
NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/26/upshot/silicon-
valley-is-growing-up-giving-parents-a-break.html?_r=0 (explaining that “[l]ong hours in the 
office and the expectations of being connected at home are familiar to workers across 
industries, not just Silicon Valley.”). 
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workplace privacy,” because employees spend less time than ever 
before in the traditional sanctity of privacy and thereby relinquish more 
privacy protections to their employer.
 65
 
3. False Sense of Security of Interconnected Lives and Autonomy 
Ultimately the flexibility of the blended work environment that 
incorporates traditionally “private” duties into the corporate campus, 
coupled with the flexible work schedule, may give employees a false 
sense of security that their lives are interconnected only when they 
choose for them to be.  As any recognizable distinctions between 
private and work spheres continue to collapse, the new social norm that 
emerges has the potential to completely unravel the legal standards of 
privacy in the employment relationship. 
As mentioned above, workers may think they are bargaining for 
the benefit of flexible technology and social media policies when they 
are actually undermining their own reasonable expectations to 
privacy.
66
  That bargain has unexpected consequences for employee 
privacy; in reality “employees who use social media to post during 
work hours, or discuss activities that took place during work hours, 
enjoy the weakest protections under the law and have a severely 
diminished expectation of privacy.”67 
The trend towards a blended, amorphous work environment has 
serious consequences for employers and employees. This structure 
weakens traditional distinctions of determining the privacy protection 
of a space based on its purpose and function.  As societal roles for 
spaces become amorphous, these societal shifts transform the threshold 
legal consideration of privacy claims and further erodes the limited 
protection available to workers. 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. Traditional Privacy Law in the Employment Relationship 
Privacy protections in the United States are enforced through a 
fragmented regulatory scheme where certain industries or categories 
are often subject to overlapping or even conflicting regulations.
68
 
Privacy in the employment relationship is no different.
69
  In the 
 
 65. Gantt, supra note 7, at 424. 
 66. See Schickman, supra note 56. 
 67. Mgrditchian, supra note 18, at 132. 
 68. Angerer, supra note 1, at 9. 
 69. Id at 7–9. (explaining that the “patchwork” of statutory attempts to provide workers 
with more privacy protections allow for a wide degree of variance with only “nominal” 
protection). 
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employment context, rights to privacy may arise from various sources: 
the United States Constitution, federal statutes, state law, common law, 
and contract.
70
 
Claims of workplace privacy invasions are highly factual inquiries 
that “must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.”71  The specific 
factual situation at issue requires courts to evaluate each particular 
situational context to determine the appropriate source of law to 
apply.
72
 
For instance, privacy invasions made by public employers are held 
to a Constitutional standard, whereas private employers are not.
73
 So 
while an invasion of privacy claim against a public employer is subject 
to the Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable search and 
seizure by the government,
74
 the same claim against a private employer 
may only be subject to state regulations.
75
  There is no universal legal 
standard of what employer actions will constitute an invasion of 
employee privacy, and due to the nature of the inquiry there is “no 
talisman that determines in all cases those privacy expectations that 
society is prepared to accept as reasonable.”76 
1.  General Framework to Determine Employment Privacy 
Despite the various sources of employment privacy law, judicial 
interpretation of the invasion of employee privacy remains similar.  
Generally courts will consider three factors to determine whether an 
employee’s right to privacy has been violated: (1) whether the 
employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy; (2) the extent of the 
employer’s intrusion on that reasonable expectation; and (3) the 
employer’s legitimate business reasons for the intrusion.77  Most courts 
 
 70. Id. at 7–9, n.67 (explaining that “[o]ther claims, such as intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and breach of contract, have 
also been used to attempt to remedy invasions of privacy by employers.”). 
 71. Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 201 N.J. 300, 317 (2010) (quoting O’Connor 
v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 718 (1987). 
 72. See Mgrditchian, supra note 18, at 113–14; O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 
(1987) (explaining the role of establishing contours of the workplace, “[b]ecause the 
reasonableness of an expectation of privacy, as well as the appropriate standard for a search, 
is understood to differ according to context, it is essential first to delineate the boundaries of 
the workplace context.”). 
 73. Mgrditchian, supra note 18, at 113–14. 
 74. Ortega, 480 U.S. at 725–26.  The Ortega case is the most influential case of 
unreasonable search and seizure by the government as an employer.  In the opinion Justice 
O’Connor established the Constitutional requirements of the ‘special needs doctrine,’ 
thereby permitting the government as an employer to invade employee privacy under a 
tiered standard of reasonableness.  
 75. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–51 (1967). 
 76. Ortega, 480 U.S. at 715. 
 77. Id. at 725–26.While O’Connor v. Ortega addressed an unwarranted search by the 
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tend to weigh an employer’s legitimate business interest more heavily 
than the employee’s privacy interest.78  This bias in favor of employers 
reflects the idea that activity in the workplace is subject to public gaze 
and that the “workplace exists [only] for work purposes.”79 
i. Common Law – Intrusion Upon Seclusion Tort 
The tort of intrusion upon seclusion is a vestige of the first 
common law recognition of privacy
80
 and remains the “most commonly 
[used tort] to protect employee privacy against excessive employer 
intrusion.”81  Intrusion upon seclusion, or the “right to be let alone,” 
was developed to “[protect] the individual from unwanted social 
invasions.”82  The jurisprudence that developed the right to be let alone 
describes privacy interests as “safe zone[s],” “private realm[s],” and a 
“private sphere.”83 
Intrusion upon seclusion “creates a cause of action when one 
intrudes ‘upon the solitude84 or seclusion of another or h[er] private 
affairs or concerns’ if the intrusion is ‘highly offensive to a reasonable 
person.’”85  This protected right to solitude “enables people to rest from 
the pressures of living in public and performing public roles.”86  Critics 
of the tort argue that the element requiring the degree of the intrusion 
to be “highly offensive” improperly places emphasis “not [on] privacy, 
but outrage.”87 
Courts generally adhere to the subtle, yet overpowering concept of 
personal space and “recognize intrusion upon seclusion tort actions 
 
government as employer, it serves as the touchstone framework for most employment 
privacy tests.  “In the case of searches conducted by a public employer, we must balance the 
invasion of the employees’ legitimate expectations of privacy against the government’s need 
for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the workplace.” Id. at 719–20. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id.  
 80. Solove, supra note 2, at 483, 552–53 (explaining the historical significance of the 
intrusion upon seclusion claim as “[o]ne of the torts inspired by Warren and Brandeis’s 
article [‘The Right to Privacy’]”). 
 81. Angerer, supra note 1, at 9. 
 82. Solove, supra note 2, at 553. 
 83. Id. at 553–54. Despite the language supporting privacy interests as a definable 
space or zone, Daniel Solove contends “intrusion [upon that zone] need not involve spatial 
incursions.” 
 84. Id. at 554. “[S]olitude, [means] the state of being alone or able to retreat from the 
presence of others.” 
 85. Id. at 553. 
 86. Id. at 555. 
 87. Matthew W. Finkin, Employee Privacy, American Values, and the Law, 72 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 221, 228 (1996) (arguing that “[t]he inescapable conclusion is that what the 
law of intrusion actually regulates is not privacy, but outrage. The law protects freedom 
from emotional distress, not freedom of informational control”). 
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only when a person is at home or in a secluded place.”88  This approach 
is essentially “akin to courts recognizing a harm in surveillance only 
when conducted in private, not in public.”89 
ii. California State Constitutional Approach 
The California state constitution established an inalienable right to 
privacy that employees may use to enforce privacy rights in the 
workplace.
90
  The California reiteration of the three factor balancing 
test focuses on the parties’ interests in light of “established social 
norms.”91 To determine established social norms, the court inquires 
into the given “customs, practices, and physical settings surrounding 
[the potential violation of privacy].”92 
Even though the “established social norms” requirement has the 
potential to enhance worker privacy rights, in practice the language 
operates similarly to the largely ineffective intrusion upon seclusion 
tort.
93
 California courts have even gone so far as to use the social 
norms consideration to eliminate employee recovery for computer 
invasions, reasoning that the mere “use of computers in the 
employment context carries with it social norms that effectively 
diminish the employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy with regard 
to h[er] use of h[er] employer’s computers.”94 
2. The Overarching Concept of a Distinct “Private Sphere” in the 
Legal Standards 
Each of the various legal approaches outlined above are connected 
by the thematic concept of a protected space, a distinct “private sphere” 
which is legally discernable and separate from work.
95
  The private 
sphere is understood as a “zone or aura around us to separate ourselves 
 
 88. Solove, supra note 2, at 555. 
 89. Id. at 555–56. 
 90. Cal. Const. art. I, § 1.  (establishing that “[a]ll people are by nature free and 
independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and 
liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, 
happiness, and privacy”); see also TBG Ins. Servs. Corp. v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 
4th 443, 450 (2002). 
 91. Cal. Const. art. I § 1.   
 92. Id. 
 93. TBG Ins. Servs. Corp., 96 Cal. App. 4th at 450.  “The ‘community norms’ aspect of 
the ‘reasonable expectation’ element of an invasion of privacy claim is this: “ ‘The 
protection afforded to the plaintiff’s interest in his privacy must be relative to the customs of 
the time and place, to the occupation of the plaintiff and to the habits of his neighbors and 
fellow citizens.’” 
 94. Id. at 452–54.  
 95. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987).  The Court presumed that it is 
possible to “delineate the boundaries of the workplace context” and suggested that the 
boundaries be a threshold determination. 
2017] #PRIVATESPHERE 303 
from others.”96  This theoretical “private sphere” is pervasive in 
privacy law,
97
 and limits the scope of privacy protections in the 
employment context where clear zones of “private” or “work” are often 
difficult to delineate. 
For example, the intrusion upon seclusion tort was created to 
“protect a safe zone, a private realm free from intrusions.”98 The tort 
establishes certain societal values as legal standards to “uphold[] rules 
of civility and social respect” by respecting other’s “territories of the 
self.”99  To prevail on an intrusion upon seclusion claim, the employer 
must have “penetrated100 some zone of physical or sensory privacy [] in 
violation of the law or social norms.”101  The thematic concept 
consistent in each legal standard to determine privacy is the reliance on 
the legal fiction of clear spatial distinctions. 
i. The Historical Development of a Legally Protected 
“Private Sphere” 
The concept of a legally protectable “private sphere” is deeply 
rooted in the original physical manifestation of privacy protections—
the family home.
102
  The American home represents a clear, legally 
protected place
103
 where a person can expect that their affairs, 
activities, words and thoughts are free from government intrusion.
104
 
The American home became the epicenter for a legally protected 
private zone in large part because of its perceived importance to 
establish familial bonds—“the home derives its pre-eminence as the 
seat of family life.”105  Marital relations and family life are considered 
 
 96. Solove, supra note 2, at 556. 
 97. Id. at 557–58 (noting that the Supreme Court first articulated the “[v]arious 
guarantees [by the Bill of Rights] create zones of privacy” in Griswold v. Connecticut). 
 98. See id. at 553. 
 99. Id. at 556.  “As Robert Post observes, the tort of intrusion upon seclusion upholds 
rules of civility and social respect. We each have certain ‘territories of the self,’ and norms 
of civility require that we respect others’ territories.” 
 100. It is troubling that the legal standard to evaluate the degree and setting of the 
intrusion are couched in terms of male sexual dominance like “penetrate.”   
 101. Ciocchetti, supra note 4, at 299. 
 102. See Solove, suprai note 2, at 552 (emphasizing the elevated legal significance of the 
home “[f]or hundreds of years, the law has strongly guarded the privacy of the home”). 
 103. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) 
(finding that “the right ‘to marry, establish a home and bring up children’ was an essential 
part of the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
 104. See id. at 484 (reiterating that “[t]he Fourth and Fifth Amendments [act] as 
protection against all governmental invasions ‘of the sanctity of a man’s home and the 
privacies of life’”). 
 105. Id. at 495 (noting that “[t]he home derives its pre-eminence as the seat of family 
life”). 
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the most private and intimate of associations.
106
  Courts recognized the 
“private realm of family life” as a natural zone to protect because of the 
belief that valuable social bonds are forged in the home.
107
 The home 
became a place of social retreat and solitude “enabl[ing] people to rest 
from the pressures of living in public and performing public roles.”108 
Three pivotal Supreme Court cases
109
 illustrate the development of 
privacy law in terms of distinct spheres and explore the judicial 
reliance on the presumed sanctity of the home to anchor new privacy 
protections.
110
 
First, in Griswold v. Connecticut the Supreme Court struck down 
a Connecticut law banning the use of contraceptives on the grounds 
that the law intruded upon a Constitutionally protected “zone of 
privacy.”111  The concurrence in Griswold found a right to sexual 
privacy by relying on an earlier Fourteenth Amendment case and re-
established that the “right ‘to marry, establish a home and bring up 
children’ was an essential part of the liberty guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”112  The Court expounded on the weight of the 
marital home as a “particularly important and sensitive area of privacy” 
and found the mere idea of the government searching the “sacred 
precincts of marital bedrooms” as “repulsive to the notions of privacy 
surrounding the marriage relationship.”113 
Second, in Katz v. United States the Court held that “wiretapping 
and eavesdropping by law enforcement agents was a constitutional 
search that would need to satisfy [] Fourth Amendment 
prerequisites.”114 Katz extended Fourth Amendment protections to 
telephone conversations, finding that the protection “cannot turn upon 
the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given 
enclosure.”115 
Most noteworthy, Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz articulated 
 
 106. Id. 
 107. Solove, supra note 2, at 555 (elaborating that “a space apart from others has 
enabled people to develop artistic, political, and religious ideas that have had lasting 
influence and value when later introduced into the public sphere”). 
 108. Id. 
 109. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); 
and Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 28 (2001). 
 110. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361(Harlan, J., concurring). “[A] man’s home is, for most 
purposes, a place where he expects privacy.” 
 111. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485. 
 112. Id. at 495 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 398 (1923)). 
 113. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86. 
 114. Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 
56 ALA. L. REV. 9, 24 (2004) (summarizing Katz). 
 115. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. 
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a two-part requirement
116
 to determine the reasonableness of a privacy 
expectation: “[1] that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy and, [2] that the expectation be one that society 
is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”117  Katz “represents a great 
touchstone in the law of privacy” because Justice Harlan’s test 
“extend[ed] beyond the confines of the Constitution [and] found its 
way into common law and statutes” expounding privacy protections.118  
The additional requirement that a privacy invasion must be subjectively 
and objectively reasonable has significantly shaped the development 
and focus of privacy rights.
119
 
Katz also represents a failed attempt to expand the right of privacy 
beyond the notion of the static home.
120
 The Court famously declared 
that the right to privacy should be attached to a person—“[f]or the 
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”121  Yet, ultimately the 
Court declined to expand privacy into a “general constitutional ‘right to 
privacy,’” preferring to leave these protections “largely to the law of 
the individual States.”122 
Third, in Kyllo v. United States, the Court held that thermovision 
imaging of a private home constituted an unlawful search under the 
Fourth Amendment.
123
  Again the Court reiterated the importance of 
the home as an anchor to privacy rights—“in the sanctity of the home, 
all details are intimate details.”124  The Court also reiterated its 
subjective-objective standard from Katz that a privacy intrusion occurs 
“when the [intruder] violates a subjective expectation of privacy that 
society recognizes as reasonable.”125 
Ultimately, these three Supreme Court cases illustrate how the 
development of privacy rights in the United States are intrinsically 
linked and entangled with the concept of a “private sphere.”126 
 
 116. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. Justice Scalia directly addressed critics in his opinion noting 
that the two-part requirement “has often been criticized as circular, and hence subjective and 
unpredictable.”   
 117. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. 
 118. Peter Winn, Katz and the Origins of the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” Test, 
40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1 (2009).. 
 119. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (establishing reasonableness of a 
privacy interest as precedent by adopting Justice Harlan’s two prong test in the majority 
opinion). 
 120. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (noting that “effort[s] to decide whether or not a given ‘area,’ 
viewed in the abstract, is ‘constitutionally protected’ deflects attention from the problem 
presented by this case”). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id at 350–51.  
 123. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
 124. Id. at 28. 
 125. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33. 
 126. Id.; Griswold, 381 U.S. 479.  
306 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:57 
ii. The “Private Sphere” Collides with Workplace Realities 
The theoretical concept of a discernable private zone remains 
central to the legal analysis of a workplace privacy invasion claim.  
The Supreme Court explains that the “essential” first step of such an 
inquiry is to “delineate the boundaries of the workplace context.”127 
This first step perpetuates a fallacy that the American employment 
relationship can be carved into a clearly designated and separate “work 
space.”128 The Court describes workplace boundaries as “those areas 
and items that are related to work and are generally within the 
employer’s control.”129  The legal standard operates in terms of 
discernable spatial boundaries, even when modern and historical 
examples of work organization show the weakness of the standard’s 
conceptual underpinnings. 
For example, Industrial Era work structures such as company 
towns and “Fordism”130 practices highlight how even more traditional 
workplace boundaries bled into the private sphere.  Employers that 
operated company towns exerted influence in both the professional and 
personal zones of its employees.  For instance, in the coal mining and 
steel industry “employers [would] pay workers in scrip redeemable 
only at the company store, located in the company town where 
employees lived and worked.”131  The legal approach to discern 
workplace boundaries as a prerequisite to privacy is inadequate to 
protect employees in these types of complicated employment 
relationships.  The work structure of a company town undercuts even 
the quintessential private sphere, the home, because all areas of the 
company town are in some sense related to the work and remained 
within the employer’s control. 
The Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) serves as another early 
example of an employment relationship that intentionally blended the 
“private” and “work” spheres.132  Ford implemented a policy to pay its 
 
 127. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987). 
 128. Id. at 715–16 (explaining workplace boundaries in a physical example “[a]t a 
hospital, for example, the hallways, cafeteria, offices, desks, and file cabinets, among other 
areas, are all part of the workplace”).  
 129. Id. at 715. 
 130. Defined by the Merriam Webster Dictionary as “a technological system that 
seeks to increase production efficiency primarily through carefully engineered 
breakdown and interlocking of production operations and that depends for its 
success on mass production by assembly-line methods.”  ‘Fordism’ Definition, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Fordism.  The actual employment 
practices and policies of Henry Ford have also been referred to as “corporate 
paternalism.”  See Leo E. Strine, Jr., A Job Is Not A Hobby: The Judicial Revival of 
Corporate Paternalism and Its Problematic Implications, 41 J. CORP. L. 71, 78 (2015).  
 131. Strine, supra note 141, at 78. 
 132. Angerer, supra note 1, at 36.; Strine, supra note 141, at 78 (elaborating that 
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employees twice the average wage on the condition that they 
“conformed to Henry Ford’s religious and moral ideals.”133  The 
structure of the employment agreement meant that even in the sanctity 
of their own home, a Ford employee could not fully enjoy a true zone 
of familial privacy because company investigators would “visit 
worker’s houses, conduct interviews, and perform inspections” to 
guarantee that employees “liv[ed] their lives according to middle class, 
Protestant values.”134  These types of invasive practices blur workplace 
boundaries and in turn diminish privacy rights because employers can 
“not only control[] employee behavior during the work days [] but also 
attempt[] to control what their workers did with their scarce free 
time.”135 
Even though the example of the Ford Motor Company’s corporate 
paternalism
136
 seems extreme, it highlights the potential flaws in 
hinging worker privacy rights on a fictional “private sphere” that is 
separate and distinct from work.  As the modern employer practice of 
extensive employee monitoring through technology
137
 is “becoming 
ubiquitous,”138 the legal fiction of a private zone of retreat is again at 
odds with protecting employee privacy. 
Today, on the whole, it is difficult for employees to gain 
meaningful privacy protections under the general legal standards.
139
  
These standards reflect judicial adherence to a legal fiction that cannot 
adequately account for the blurred lines between “zones.” As a 
practical matter, in employment privacy “for the most part, private 
employers must intrude into very private places — such as restrooms 
or locker rooms — to face liability for [a privacy claim].”140 
Typical workplace privacy issues arise from employer actions, 
such as physical and psychological testing, investigatory interrogations 
and searches of persons/spaces, monitoring and surveillance, inquiries 
 
“Corporate paternalism was not an incidental aspect of the scheme: paying workers in scrip, 
and controlling where they could live, enabled employers to police all aspects of their 
workers’ lives”). 
 133. Id. at 81.   
 134. Id.   
 135. Id. at 73.   
 136. Id. (arguing that transition to industrial capitalism in American bred “a new strain 
of feudalism returned in the form of something that might charitably be called ‘corporate 
paternalism’”). 
 137. Id. at 75.  “Employers are limiting the privacy of workers through technology—
such as workplace phone and computer monitoring, cameras, or drug and nicotine testing—
for bottom line, business reasons.” 
 138. Ciocchetti, supra note 4, at 357. 
 139. Angerer, supra note 1, at 4.  “Moreover, employment law has, unfortunately, 
proven to be woefully inadequate in promoting and protecting employee privacy at the 
workplace.” 
 140. Ciocchetti, supra note 4, at 301. 
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into prohibitions of off-site conduct and revelations into private 
matters.
141
 Employers offer various legitimate business concerns to 
justify perceived privacy invasions, including maintaining the public 
image of the business, ensuring productivity, effectively evaluating 
work performance, and thwarting potential employee misconduct.
142
 
B. Why Employee Privacy Protections Fail at the Threshold Issue: Did 
the Employee Have a Reasonable Expectation or Privacy? 
The threshold issue an employee must establish to proceed with an 
invasion of privacy claim is whether or not she had an objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  This initial element “offer[s] little 
help to employees because of the decreased expectation of privacy 
inherent in any workplace.”143 
Whether or not an employee’s expectation of privacy in her work 
setting is reasonable is addressed on a “case-by-case basis”144 and 
considers the “customs, practices, and physical settings [] as well as the 
opportunity to be notified in advance and consent to the intrusion.”145 
Employers can easily defeat the threshold element of reasonable 
expectation to privacy through proper planning with prior notice, 
written consent and practices and procedures.
146
  Therefore, the legal 
standard a plaintiff must meet in a privacy claim is particularly 
“difficult []to meet in the workplace context,”147 in part because regular 
employee monitoring is a widely accepted practice and also because 
jurisprudence tends to favor employer’s interests more heavily in a 
balancing test for privacy.
148
 
1. Notice as a Restriction on “Reasonable Expectation of 
Privacy” 
Notice serves as a protective mechanism to decimate or restrict 
employee privacy claims because it effectively limits the 
“reasonableness” of the employee’s expectation of privacy before an 
issue even arises.
149
 The following cases involve nearly identical facts 
but illustrate the problematic jurisprudence that develops when privacy 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. Mgrditchian, supra note 18, at 133; S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Revisiting the 
Public/private Distinction: Employee Monitoring in the Workplace, 32 GA. L. REV. 825, 
836–38 (1998). 
 143. See Ciocchetti, supra note 4, at 357–58. 
 144. Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 201 N.J. 300, 317 (2010). 
 145. Ciocchetti, supra note 4, at 297–98. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 299. 
 148. See id. at 290, 357–58.  
 149. Id. 
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protections are determined state by state. 
Two cases involving attorney-client email communications sent 
using employer issued computers demonstrate the power of notice as a 
proactive tactic to limit the likelihood of an employee prevailing on a 
privacy claim.
150
  These examples show how even the “oldest of the 
privileges for confidential communications known to the common law” 
rooted in a fundamental public policy to promote justice
151
 can fall 
under the reasonable expectation of privacy requirement. 
First, in Holmes v. Petrovich the court held that an employee did 
not have a reasonable expectation to privacy in her email 
communications with her lawyer because she sent the email from a 
company issued computer and the employer had a computer usage 
policy that warned the employee that electronic communications were 
subject to company monitoring.
152
  Even though the employee 
“believed her personal e-mail would be private because she utilized a 
private password [] and she deleted the e-mails after they were sent,” 
the Holmes court analogized the use of a company issued device to 
communicate with an attorney as “akin to consulting her attorney in 
one of defendants’ conference rooms, in a loud voice, with the door 
open, yet unreasonably expecting that the conversation overheard by 
[employer] would be privileged.”153  In Holmes, the prior notice from 
the computer usage policy effectively destroyed the employee’s ability 
to meet the threshold consideration of a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.
154
 
On the other hand, in Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., the 
court held that the employee did have an expectation of privacy in her 
email communications with her lawyer.
155
  Here the employee also 
used a work-issued computer to send the communication, but she 
prevailed because she took “steps to protect the privacy of those e-
mails and shield them from her employer” and the computer usage 
 
 150. Holmes v. Petrovich Dev. Co., 191 Cal. App. 4th 1047, 1068 (2011) 
 151. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (explaining that “the 
purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients 
and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of 
justice”). 
 152. See Holmes v. Petrovich Dev. Co., 191 Cal. App. 4th 1047, 1068 (2011) 
(explaining the legal test as: “when (1) the electronic means used belongs to the defendant; 
(2) the defendant has advised the plaintiff that communications using electronic means are 
not private, may be monitored, and may be used only for business purposes; and (3) the 
plaintiff is aware of and agrees to these conditions”).  
 153. Holmes, 191 Cal. App. 4th at 1068–69. . 
 154. Id. at 1071 (noting that “employer policies concerning communications will of 
course shape the reasonable expectations of their employees, especially to the extent that 
such policies are clearly communicated”). 
 155. See generally Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 201 N.J. 300, 321–22 (2010). 
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agreement was vague.
156
   Despite the employee favorable ruling, the 
Stengart court was careful to limit their holding to prevent an 
expansion of privacy rights to employees, noting that their legal 
conclusion “does not mean that employers cannot monitor or regulate 
the use of workplace computers.”157 While the legal outcome for the 
plaintiff in Stengart was favorable, the court still made sure to note the 
power of effective prior notice to shape a reasonable expectation of 
privacy at work. 
2. The Power of Consent as a Restriction 
Even if an employee can show that their privacy interest is 
objectively reasonable, their attempt to gain a legal remedy can still fail 
with proof that they agreed to the possibility of the invasion.
158
 
For example, in Feminist Women’s Health Ctr. v. Superior Court 
the court reiterated the power of consent to trump invasions—
“[c]onsent remains a viable defense even in cases of serious privacy 
invasions.”159  Here, the employer required a health care worker to 
demonstrate a cervical self-exam by inserting a speculum into her 
vagina in front of coworkers and female clients.
160
  Even though the 
court determined that the cervical self-exam “infringe[d] a legally 
protected privacy interest,” the plaintiff signed a consent form to the 
policy in her new hire documents so her otherwise strong claim to 
privacy invasion was defeated as a matter of law.
161
 
In conclusion, even when a plaintiff employee can successfully 
meet the threshold requirement that their expectation of privacy be 
“reasonable”, these claims often fail because employers notified the 
employee of the invasion prior to the incident or obtained signed 
consent to the invasion.
162
 
IV. PROPOSAL 
I propose a two-part approach to address the failures of privacy 
rights in the employment relationship.  First I suggest private ordering 
as an interim solution to address the significant power and 
informational imbalances between employees and employers.  This 
interim solution aims to educate workers, curb employer monitoring 
 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 324–25. 
 158. Feminist Women’s Health Ctr. v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. App. 4th 1234, 1249 
(1997). 
 159. Id. 
 160. See id at 1237. 
 161. Id. at 1247–49. 
 162. See Ciocchetti, supra note 4, at 297–98. 
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practices, and ultimately allow employees to become meaningful 
participants in the labor market and political process to advocate for 
their own privacy rights.  Secondly, to truly address the inherent 
pitfalls of the legal standards of privacy protections in the employment 
context I recommend a return to the Katz approach of conceptualizing 
privacy as a fluid concept attached to a person, and overhauling the 
“reasonable” requirement to properly calibrate privacy rights to 
freedom of informational control as opposed to acceptable social 
outrage. 
First, this private ordering solution borrows from successful 
privacy standards developed by the international community
163
 to 
create a flexible structure that can lead to a conceptual overhaul of 
privacy law and elevate the bargaining power of employees.
164
  I 
recommend employers that choose to engage in employee monitoring 
incorporate the two key consumer choice principles of Collection 
Limitation and Purpose Specification into their corporate practices.
165
 
The Collection Limitation Principle would allow an employee to 
restrict the data collected about herself by her employer in an “opt-in” 
choice.
166
  Whereas the Purpose Specification Principle would restrict 
the employer from using the data on an employee in any way not 
previously disclosed.
167
 Incorporating these principles will ensure that 
organizations limit the collection of potentially sensitive private data 
about their employees and only use collected data for a disclosed 
purpose. 
Additionally, using these consumer choice principles in the 
employment context would also help to rectify the power and 
informational imbalance between an employee and their employer. 
Although employers have used notice and consent principles mainly as 
a weapon against employee claims to privacy, these consumer choice 
 
 163. OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal 
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 166. See id. at 158 (explaining that the Collection Limitation Principle “allows data 
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 167. Id. at 159 (explaining further that “the Purpose Specification Principle further limits 
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driven principles should force nefarious monitoring practices into the 
public debate for scrutiny as employees become more involved in the 
decisions about what data is collected and how it is used.  This interim 
step aims to bring both employer and employee expectations of privacy 
issues and actual practices into alignment. 
Finally, the ultimate goal of the quasi-self-regulatory scheme is to 
improve employer understanding of the potential legal liability inherent 
in excessive data gathering and educate employees about the reality of 
their limited privacy protections at work.  The private ordering gap 
filler proposal accounts for the time necessary for technologies to 
mature before implementing the wide sweeping legislative change 
necessary to dethrone the “private sphere” distinction and rebuild legal 
privacy protections for workers.  The new regime of privacy 
protections in the employment context should abandon the objectively 
reasonable requirement that wrongfully elevates generally acceptable 
outrage over true privacy and freedom of informational control. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, modern employment trends exacerbate the 
inadequacies of the legal standards that could provide privacy 
protections to workers.  Technological advancements increase the 
amount of sensitive data employers capture from their employees and 
foster 24/7 work schedules where the legal fiction of a private sphere 
collapses with the blended realities of twenty-first century work. 
Under the current regime of privacy doctrine in the employment 
context, employers are able to defeat most claims of privacy invasions 
through careful planning and adherence to industry standards.  To 
remedy the substantial power and informational imbalances between 
employees and employers an interim quasi-self-regulatory system has 
the flexibility to address immediate concerns and adapt appropriately to 
rapidly changing technology.  Most importantly, the interim system 
forces employees into active roles in the negotiation for privacy in the 
workplace thereby empowering a new group of potential advocates.  
Advocating with experience in the complex modern employment 
relationship may support legislative efforts that can do away with static 
notions of physical zones and return to privacy rooted in the person, 
and focused on the freedom, of informational privacy. 
 
 
 
 
 
